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ABSTRACT 
NASA vehicle 4.113 GA-GI, an Aerobee 150 launched 
from the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico in April 
1964, experienced a "hard" s tar t  (an explosive initial com- 
bustion generating high chamber pressures) which resulted 
in other anomalies, including a tail can explosion after 27 
seconds of flight. The most probable cause of the hard 
s tar t  was an improper rupture sequence of the fueland oxi- 
dizer diaphragms which could have resulted from an im- 
proper fuel bleed o r  manufacturing discrepancies. As a 
result of corrective measures, no hard starts occurred in 
eighteen later Aerobee flights in 1964. 
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AEROBEE 150 PROPULSION FAILURE 
by 
J. R. Busse and P .  S. Bushnell, Jr. 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
1 INTRODUCTION 
I NASA vehicle 4.113 GA-GI, an Aerobee 150 launched from the White Sands Missile Range, New 
Mexico on 21 April 1964, experienced a "hard" start (an explosive initial combustion generating 
high chamber pressures) which resulted in other anomalies including a tail can explosion after 
27 seconds of flight. 
including an analysis of flight performance data and flight films, and corrective action taken to 
avoid a recurrence in future flights. 
This report describes an investigation of this propulsion system failure, 
PREFLIGHT PREPARATION 
Aerobee 150 rocket 4.113 GA-GI (sustainer NASA 97-3) was prepared for launching by Navy 
personnel at the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Facility, White Sands with the assistance of Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC) and Space General Corporation (SGC) personnel in  accordance with 
detailed check sheets issued by SGC and approved by NASA/GSFC. The rocket was originally 
shipped from El Monte, California to the Churchill Research Range, Manitoba, Canada but was 
later sent to WSMR via Railway Express. 
No major discrepancies were noted during the manufacture of sustainer 97-3 by SGC and no 
abnormal conditions were noted during rocket checkout; however, during the 100 psig gas leak test, 
a leak was observed at the fuel and oxidizer propellant tank fill ports. The fuel and oxidizer gas 
burst  diaphragms were removed and inspected. Proper torquing of the gas orifice nuts upon re- 
installation eliminated the leak. The 15 psig leak checks were performed and checks were made 
for  leaks through the propellant diaphragms at the thrust chamber nozzle. All "B"-nuts and fit- 
tings were set with Loctite sealant or safety-wired and then leak-checked. The pressure switch 
on the helium f i l l  line was pressure tested and installed in the forward skirt. 
The rocket was then transferred to the monorail laboratory for the horizontal payload test. 
According io nui-iiia: przcc&re, hcriznntgl payload checks were performed, the rocket was weighed, 
and the center of gravity was determined. The payload was removed, weighed, and the center of 
gravity was computed for  use in determining payload instability during recovery. 
Following mating of the sustainer with the booster, the rocket was transported to the launch 
tower and installed. The helium tank was subjected to400and3,OOOpsig leak tests in the tower. Ver- 
tical payload checks were commenced following the attachment of the payload to the rocket. After a 
difficulty with the umbilical connector was corrected, the -5 hour payload check was performed. 
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Following a final inspection of the rocket, the NASA representatives left the tower to observe 
the propellant-servicing operation from the edge of the launch pad. NO difficulties were experi- 
enced with the oxidizer pumping system but a problem with the fuel pump caused a slight delay in 
the fueling operation. The pumping problem was  corrected by Navy personnel. Final tower inspec- 
tion was performed following propellant servicing. The booster igniter was installed and the 
helium tank w a s  pressurized to an indicated 3,450 psig. 
LAUNCH AND FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
The firing of NASA 4.113 GA-GIwas accompanied by a loud bang and the rocket emitted an un- 
usual sound variously described as a whine, a scream, or a low-pitched whistle in leaving the tower. 
The flame and smoke did not appear normal, the booster being partially obscured by a dense cloud 
of smoke which w a s  reddish brown (Figure l ) ,  in contrast to the usual orange sustainer flame and 
almost gray-white exhaust trail  from the booster propellant combustion of normal flights (Figure 2). 
Figure 1 -NASA 4 .11  3 G A - G I  launching from 
WSMR. 
Figure 2-A normal Aerobee 150 leaving the 
tower at WSMR (NASA 4 .67  NP) .  
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Figure 3-Aft bulkhead of fuel tank and thrust 
structure of motor after removal from tankage. 
Figure 4-Fuel tank bulkhead 
separated from the tankage. 
Observers outside the blockhouse saw a brilliant white flash approximately 27 seconds after 
launch, which was assumed to have resulted from an explosion of the tail section. The dense red- 
dish brown exhaust cloud characterizing the launch was viewed throughout the entire flight. Movies 
were taken of the rocket through apogee to impact approximately five miles from the launch tower. 
Due to the low altitude and brief duration of the flight, none of its experimental objectives was 
realized. 
POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION 
Postflight inspection of the rocket revealed that the tail can, sustainer fins and fuel coolant 
tap were missing. Aisu, ciiaiiiber pressure t q  was hrnken. Only one of the fins with a portion 
of the tail can magnesium skin was found after a search of the entire area. However, there was no 
evidence of melting or burning on these parts of the recovered propulsion system plumbing. Some 
damage had been sustained by the rocket from the impact-the thrust structure was bent and the 
propellant tankage was dented. 
Clearly visible in Figure 3, which shows the aft bulkhead of the fuel tank and the motor thrust 
structure, is an aniline residue on the outside of the thrust chamber. The fuel line is broken just 
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between the B-nut and the attachment to the fuel tank bulkhead. Subsequent metallurgical analysis I 
. I  of this fracture at GSFC substantiated the assumption of an impact fracture of this piece. 
Figure 4 also illustrates this bulkhead covered with a burned aniline residue, except in the 
area in line with the chamber pressure connector. The chamber pressure connector and the con- 
trol  and instrumentation wiring were clean and showed no traces of heating. The plumbing was 
coated with the aniline residue, the heaviest coating appearing on the forward side of the compo- 
nents. There w a s  little o r  no residue on the under side. Residue was also noted on the edges of 
the hole created by the missing fuel tap and the broken chamber pressure tap was heavily coated 
(a diagram of the propulsion system identifying the various parts discussed in the report is given 
in Figure 5). 
PRESSURIZATION LINE 
PROPELLANT 
DIAPHRAGM (OXIDIZER) 
ESSURE LINE PRESSURE TANK 
CHECK VALVE 
FUEL LINE FROM 
TANK TO COOLANT 
FUEL LINE FRO 
TO DIAPHRAGM HOUSING AND 
AND INJECTOR INJECTOR ) 
Figure 5-Diagram of Aerobee 150 propulsion system. 
Figure 6a shows the rocket motor after removal. Figure 6b is a close-up view illustrat- 
ing the missing tap on the propellant line f rom the coolant jacket to the fuel injector, and 
the broken chamber pressure tap covered with the residue. Metallurgical analysis at GSFC 
of the mode of fracture of the propellant line tap indicated that it failed by application of a 
force in the opposite direction to the force that would have been applied by impact, a fact  
which w a s  instrumental in establishing the failure of the tap during the hard start and in ex- 
plaining subsequent performance. 
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Figure 7-Mixture ratio orifice. 
The mixture ratio orifice (Figure 7) was 
still in its proper place and of the proper size 
(0.78 in.). Also, if  may be observed that the 
outer ring on the oxidizer burst diaphragm was 
still intact in its proper position. The fuel and 
oxidizer strainer cages (Figure 8) were in- 
spected. A trapped "O"-ring that was dislodged 
from the fuel shutoff valve may be seen in a 
close-up view of the fuel strainer in Figure 9. 
The shutoff valves were in the open position. 
Figure 6a-Rocket motor after disassembly. 
The helium pressure regulator was re- 
moved and returned to the manufacturer for 
flow tests. The aft bulkhead was removed 
and returned to GSFC along with plumbing 
and motor parts. The motor and plumbing 
were disassembled, inspected, photographed, 
and submitted for metallurgical examination. 
Figure 6b-Close-up view of damaae 
sustained by rocket motor. 
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' I  . 3 
Figure 8-Fuel 'ond oxidizer strainers. 
- -  
Figure 9-An "0"-r ing wedged in  the fuel strainer. 
DATA REDUCTION 
Chamber pressure, magnetometer, and acceleration telemetry data were received, reduced, 
and plotted. Both Contraves and radar metric data were used to provide trajectory data. Track- 
ing and documentary films of the flight, both 16 and 35 mm color and black-and-white, were care- 
fully studied and compared with similar films for successful Aerobee 150 launchings. 
Chamber Pressure 
Telemetry data based on voltage ratios f rom preflight calibration curves (Figure 10) show that 
chamber pressure rose rapidly to 190 psia at 0.06 seconds after ignition and continued to build up 
erratically, reaching a maximum of 330 psia at 0.49 seconds (Figure 11). (Presumably the f r e -  
quency response of the Giannini pressure transducer was inadequate to record the maximum pres- 
sure  encountered during the hard start.) It then fell off drastically. The initial peak followed by 
the erratic buildup and sharp dropoff were significant factors  indicating a reas  for  investigation. 
, , 
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VOLTAGE RATIO 
Figure 10-Comparison of preflight and postflight 
pressure transducer calibration. 
z 200 
CL a
TIME AFTER IGNITION (secs) 1 
Figure 11-Chamber pressure during 
the first second of flight. 
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Chamber pressure data f rom 0.8 seconds to the loss of the signal at 27.5 seconds, based on a 
recalibration of the transducer, is shown in Figure 12. The postflight chamber pressure transducer 
calibrations were slightly higher than the manufacturer's plotted calibration (Figures 10 and 12). 
Chamber pressure began to increase at 23.5 seconds of flight and at 27.5 seconds, the point at 
which telemetry was lost, the transducer gage read 85 psi (which was subsequently presumed to 
be tail can pressure). 
L 
h 0 DENOTES PRESSURE TRANSDUCER PLOT 
(CALIBRATION AFTER FLIGHT). 
X DENOTES PRESSURE TRANSDUCER PLOT 
(CALIBRATION BEFORE FLIGHT). 
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r r -  
Y s -  
9 u 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
TIME AFTER IGNITION (recs) 
Figure 12-Pressure transducer readings. 
-""I I 
PRESSURE TAP FAILURE 
; 300.- 
ii 
Y 
- I 
TAIL CAN PRESSURE 
' 
FLIGHT 4.77GS 
THEORETICAL - FLIGHT 4.75UA /' ----- 9 //' 100 / 
I\ - FLIGHT 4.78GS ---  FIIGHT 4113 G A - G I  1 -  r I I I I 1 1  I I I I I 
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 0 0.10 0.20 0.30 
TIME (secr) 
Figure 13-Comparative start transient chamber pressure data. 
7 
I 
Figure 13 presents several normal chamber pressure transducer plots compared to the start 
transient trace for NASA 4.113 GA-GI. Also included is a theoretical chamber pressure curve. 
The erratic performance of NASA 4.113 GA-GI can readily be noted. 
Acceleration 
Acceleration curves were plotted from both telemetry (Figure 14) and Contraves data (Fig- 
ure  15). The telemetry acceleration data are now considered to be of questionable value compared 
to the more reliable data produced from Contraves optical tracking, which was excellent throughout 
the flight. 
According to both telemetry and Contraves data, acceleration reached 10 g during the first 
2.5 seconds, dropping to 1 g after booster burnout (2.5 seconds). Both data sources were in agree- 
ment within 0.1 g from booster burnout until 9 seconds. 
From telemetry, acceleration began to increase again at 9 seconds, reaching 1.6 g at 12 sec- 
onds. It increased again at 13 seconds reaching 3.5 g at 17 seconds. Between 17 and 19 seconds, 
it reached four major peaks, fluctuating between 3.5 to 4.5 g. No explanation has been deduced f o r  
this abnormal behavior, other than that it was possibly due to accelerometer resonance during 
flight caused by the erratic chamber operation, o r  rocket coning motion producing a centrifugal 
acceleration. Acceleration decreased gradually to 1.6 g between 19 and 24 seconds. At 25 seconds, 
another period of erratic acceleration was  experienced until telemetry was lost at 27.5 seconds. 
According to Contraves optical tracking data, acceleration did not drop below 1 g from 9.4 sec- 
onds until the loss of Contraves data at 26.5 seconds, and reached peaks of 1.75 gand2.2 ga t  25 sec- 
onds and 26.5 seconds, respectively. Generally, observed acceleration was a little low, although not 
- 1  I I I I I I I I  I 1 1 1  1 1  1 1  I [  1 1 1  I I I I I  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
TIME ( s e a )  
Figure 14-Telemetry acceleration data. 
8 
. 
11 
10 
L 
9 -  
- 
ZD 
v 
z 6 -  
o_ 
E 
2 5 -  
w 
-I 4- 
Q 3 -  
2 -  
V 
0- 
I 
- 
8 -  
7 -  
NO DATA 
1 -  
- 1 1  I I I I I I I 1 ' 1  1 I 1 1  I I I I 1 1 1  I " ' I  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2 3  24 25 26 27 
TIME (secs) 
Figure 15-Contraves opti ca I tracking acceleration do to. 
too abnormal. This performance could be obtained from a rocket operating under an extreme mix- 
ture ratio condition. (The normal 150 mixture ratio is 2.56 to 1, oxidizer to fuel.) 
The acceleration data substantiate the failure of the pressure tap, as the observed acceleration 
could not have been obtained from chamber pressure as that recorded by the transducer. 
Velocity 
The velocity data received from reduced Contraves trajectory data indicated that the rocket 
was traveling at 735 fps at booster burnout (Figure 16). The velocity at 26.5 seconds, when track- 
ing was lost, was 1575 fps. A later integration of acceleration curves from Contraves and telemetry 
instrumentation data indicated velocities of 1644 and 2292 fps, respectively, the latter being less 
reliable data. Compared to the velocity expected of a normal Aerobee 150 flight, the observed 
velocities were low but the increase was steady. 
Altitude 
Figure 17 shows t ie  aiiiiuiie perform~xe  fnr the flight plotted from smoothed radar data. 
Figure 18 illustrates an expected performance trajectory for a rocket of similar payload weight 
and launch elevation. The sustainer should have burned out at 51.8 seconds at an altitude of 
129,445 feet. Actually, all combustion was completed between 46 and 47 seconds, with a loss of 
effective propulsion at 27.4 seconds when the tail can was lost and the vehicle went into a violent 
tumbling and flat spinning motion. It was  the tumbling (high drag) rocket motion which caused the 
vehicle to descend slowly. Whereas the altitude at 27.4 seconds should have been somewhere be- 
tween 40,000-50,000 feet, it was only 34,000 feet. 
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Figure 16-Contraves trajectory velocity data. 
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The color photograph of the launch, (Fig- 
u r e  1) clearly illustrates the unusual colored 
exhaust which lasted through the flight. Also, 
excellent black-and-white films taken the first 
seconds of launch provided detailed views of the vehicle going up the tower. The sequence in Fig- 
u r e  19, taken at the rate of 20 frames per second, indicates the hard start. Note the shape Of the 
flame, and also the abnormally large flash, which was a result of high-pressure start conditions. 
Figure 17-Altitude vs. time (smoothed radar). 
The sustainer ignited 0.2 to 0.3 seconds after booster ignition. The booster ignition was con- 
sidered to be the f i rs t  flame from which smoke could be recognized in the black-and-white tracking 
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Figure 18-Expected performance trajectory for a rocket of similar weight and payload to that of 4.1 13 GA-GI. 
films. At approximately 0.55 to 0.60 seconds, the sustainer flame apparently went out, but again 
became visible at 0.65 seconds and lasted until 0.70 seconds (note frames d, e, f ,  g in Figure 19). 
At this time, as indicated by color photographs, the smoke from a residual sustainer flame had 
become a dark reddish brown. When the rocket left the tower at 0.95 to 1.0 seconds, it was still  
emitting a dense cloud of reddish brown smoke. On the basis of its color and the characteristic 
odor present in the air, observers concluded that the smoke was rich in IRFNA (inhibited red 
fuming nitric acid). 
Compare the normal flame in Figure 2 of Aerobee 4.67 N P  with the flame in Figure 1 of NASA 4.113 
GA-GI. The flame in Figure 1 is shorter but wider, and the booster is almost obscured from view by 
the dense smoke which starts weil  foi-c-+z,-d  the booster. Normally, the booster fins a r e  easily 
identifiable since the normal gray-white smoke comes from the booster. However, it is see11 iii 
Figure 1 that the smoke, instead of the normal orange flame, also came from the sustainer motor. 
At approximately 2.5 seconds, the booster separated, after which the sustainer flame pulsated 
(alternate short  flame, long flame, see Figure 20) at 10 cps and continued to burn with a reddish 
brown smoke that faded to a pale yellow-white at approximately 20 seconds. At approximately 
25.05 seconds, a tpuff" was  observed. Other such puffs were observed at 25.4, 25.8, 26.3, 26.75, 
11 
-.--- 
k A -  i 
Figure ]%sequence (20 fps) of NASA 4.1 13 GA-GI l ift-off. 
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Figure 20-Sequence of pulsating flame. 
and 27.2 seconds. Owing to the tracking angle of the camera loaded with color film, color photo- 
graphs of the puffs were not taken. This is unfortunate since it is not possible to  determine from 
the black-and-white tracking films whether the puffs were smoke o r  flame. 
Figure 21a shows the tail can explosion at 27.4 seconds. Notice the angle of the rocket just 
after the explosion. Figure 21b is a view of the explosion from another tracking camera taken 
about 1/2 second later. Notice in this view also that the rocket is traveling almost sideways. 
Figure 210-Tail can explosion (+27.4 seconds). 
ANALYSIS OF RECOVERED ROCKET COMPONENTS 
Figure 21b-Tail can explosion ( f i lm from another 
camera at approximately +28 seconds). 
The recovered sustainer was returned to the U.S. Naval Ordnance Missile Test Facility, the 
helium p res su re  regulator was sent to the SGC fo r  testing, and the aft end of the fuel tank and 
motor assembly, including the motor plumbing, were returned to GSFC for examination. 
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Postflight flow tests of the regulator at SGC revealed no flaws in the regulator o r  significant 
variations from preflight flow characteristics. No obstructions were observed in the helium, 
oxidizer, or fuel tanks, gas lines, propellant lines, shutoff valves, burst diaphragm housings, thrust 
chamber jacket (which was cut away for inspection), o r  the injector head. 
’ 
I 
I 
The previously noted displacement of the O-ring from the pintle of the shutoff valve (Figure 8) 
could not be related in any way to the failure of 4.113 GA-GI but did point up a serious design 
deficiency in the fuel shutoff valve, used to conserve helium gas on attitude control system flights, 
which has been remedied by employing a new shutoff valve seat. 
Also, it was observed that a portion of the chamber pressure tap and B-nut were missing 
(Figure 4). In addition to a break in the fuel line at the base of the fuel tank, a tap on the fuel 
coolant outlet line of the thrust chamber was missing. The squibs in the shutoff valves were un- 
fired. The parts were submitted for metallurgical analysis. 
The interior of the combustion chamber was examined. All fuel and oxidizer injector holes 
were open, and the hole for the chamber pressure tap was unobstructed and showed only a very 
small amount of errosion. 
Tank ullages were volume-checked and found within specifications and no abnormalities were 
observed in gas or propellant diaphragms o r  orifices. The remaining portions of the gas and pro- 
pellant diaphragms were examined to ascertain that only single thicknesses of material had been 
employed in manufacturing the portions that rupture. The check valve in the gas circuit functioned 
normally during posff light examination. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The eyewitness reports, the noises, the exhaust odor, and the pulsating flame accompanied by 
the oxidizer-rich smoke cloud observed as the vehicle left the launch tower, coupled with onboard 
telemetering, radar, and theodolite data, clearly indicate that NASA rocket 4.113 GA-GI experi- 
enced unstable combustion conditions which continued until the tail can explosion at 27.4 seconds 
as a result of pressure built up by combustion gas and fuel. The other abnormalities during the 
flight a r e  also the result of the malfunction occurring in the start transient. 
A hard s tar t  can occur either if there is a fuel lead into the combustion chamber, o r  a signifi- 
cant delay i n  ignition (Appendix A gives a brief discussion of ignition phenomena). When either Of 
these happen, high combustion chamber pressures are generated which can rupture parts of the 
thrust chamber. Pressures  experienced during hard starts on test stand firings, f o r  example, have 
been observed to be sufficient to cause extremely high chamber pressure through the fuel injector 
head-high enough, in fact, to blow out the pressure tap on the fuel line between the coolant jacket 
and the injector or  to  break the chamber pressure tap, both of which are believed to have happened 
on this flight. The burned aniline fuel residue on the fuel tank aft bulkhead and the outside of the 
thrust chamber, evident in Figures 3 and 4, presumably resulted from the flow of large quantities 
of fuel into the tail can section after the tap on the fuel line was blown out. 
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By reviewing similar hard start conditions on other flights (Appendix B describes an Air 
Force failure at Eglin AFB, 1960), and by discussing the results of test stand firings in which hard 
starts were observed, possible causes of a hard s tar t  in the Aerobee have been postulated: 
! '  
1 
I 1. Improper helium pressure regulation resulting in improper propellant tank pressurization 
and improper initial propellant flow rates. 
2. Obstructions in propellant o r  gas lines, etc. causing an unbalanced flow of propellants. 
3. Improper propellant contents and temperatures resulting in ignition lag. 
4. Improper-sized gas o r  mixture ratio orifices. 
5. Structural failures at normal working pressures. 
6. Improper ullage affecting tank pressurization rates. 
7. Improper burst sequence of propellant diaphragms. 
I 
I 
8.  Improper burst sequence of gas diaphragms. 
9. Improper fuel bleed. 
Of the above possible causes of a hard start all but three have been eliminated. Cause 1 was 
eliminated by the postflight flow tests and inspection at SGC. Cause 2 was eliminated by a post- 
flight visual inspection. 
Cause 3 was eliminated since propellant contents and temperatures for this flight were within 
l specifications, ruling out the possibility of ignition lag. Chemical analyses performed on both 
propellants before and after flight verified that propellant contents were within specifications. 
Temperatures of the propellants in the rocket tanks taken immediately after servicing were 62°F 
for  the oxidizer and 72°F for the fuel. Thus no significant change could have taken place in pro- 
pellant expansion or contraction (which would affect ullage and ultimately tank pressurization rates), 
as ambient temperature at lift-off was 62°F. 
Cause 4 was eliminated by postflight measurements and inspection. Cause 5 was eliminated 
when a metallurgical investigation of the recovered rocket components concluded that the failure 
was not due to structural failure o r  manufacturing defect. 
Cause 6, improper ullage, perhaps merits consideration in somewhat greater detail. An exces- 
sive ullage in the oxidizer tank would increase time required to pressurize the oxidizer which in 
turn could well cause a fuel lead into the combustion chamber. On the other hand, an insufficient 
ullage in the fuel tank might also cause a fuel lead-in through excessive tank pressure. Improper 
ullage can result  from either a 'buildup" of manufacturing tolerances, changes in propellant tem- 
peratures, o r  f rom improper servicing techniques. Some difficulty was experienced in the fueling 
operation of this flight, but was reported to have been remedied. 
The possibility of improper ullage due to deviation from manufacturing tolerances has been 
ruled out by postflight volume measurement of recovered hardware. Improper ullage due to other 
factors is ruled out by the slight temperature variation from propellant servicing time to launch 
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time and visual assurance of three observers that the propellant tanks were properly loaded and 
good return flow was obtained through the "Yl'-nozzles, used to f i l l  the propellant tanks. 
Thus, three significant possible causes, 7, 8 and 9, remain: a gas diaphragm bursting out-of- 
specification, a propellant diaphragm bursting out-of-specification, o r  an improper fuel bleed. 
If a gas diaphragm breaks out-of-tolerance, a pressurization sequence occurs which could 
cause an improperly balanced flow of fuel and oxidizer and possibly a fuel lead-in. Likewise, i f  
the propellant diaphragms burst out-of-tolerance, a fuel lead into the thrust chamber o r  excessive 
initial flow rates could cause a hard start. Since quality control measures for inspecting diaphragms 
require their total destruction, it is impossible to  state that a particular diaphragm will not break 
at an improper pressure. Appendix C contains information on gas and propellant burst diaphragm 
tests conducted subsequent to the 4.113 GA-GI failure in order to substantiate the reliability of 
these diaphragms. 
If the air is not properly bled out of the thrust chamber coolant jacket while the start slug is 
being inserted, the entrapped air acts as a compressible spring. A pressure surge, similar to a 
"water hammer" effect, could occur causing the fuel diaphragm to break early, allowing fuel to 
precede the oxidizer into the thrust chamber. 
Although it is impossible to state conclusively which of the above conditions was definitely 
responsible for this failure, improper fuel bleed or  propellant diaphragm failure is considered the 
most likely. 
Gas diaphragm failure is considered the least likely of the causes of the malfunction which have 
not been positively eliminated because these diaphragms experience a very high gas pressure rise 
rate (greater than 70,000 psi/sec) to the working regulated pressure. Consequently an extreme 
manufacturing discrepancy would be required to cause a significant difference in diaphragm burst- 
ing time. The burst pressure of one of the diaphragms would probably have to be greater than the 
regulated pressure for this to exist. 
As a result of the failure of NASA flight 4.113 GA-GI measures have since been taken to avoid 
a recurrence: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Increased checks a r e  being performed during rocket buildup to assure  that the vafious 
potential causes of a hard start (itemized above) cannot exist. 
Increased quality control is being maintained in the production of propellant and gas burst  
diaphragms (Appendix D). 
Increased care  is being exercised in propellant servicing especially in bleeding the thrust 
chamber jacket by flowing an increased quantity of fuel through the jacket and out the bleed 
fitting. There does, however, exist some doubt in the authors' opinion as to the adequacy 
of this technique. Other techniques for assuring that all air is removed from the jacket 
are being investigated. * 
*At the time of printing this note, a bleed technique utilizing quick disconnects i s  being incorporated into the rocket servicing 
procedure. 
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RF'NA-furfuryl alcohol, were thoroughly investigated to determine their ignition-lag behavior 
under various conditions. Based on the results of these studies, parameters such as stream 
velocity, propellant-tank pressure, and mixture ratio, which may have some effect on ignition lag, 
were standardized and subsequent tests on other systems were performed under one set of condi- 
tions to facilitate comparison of results. 
Although the  absolute values of the ignition lags determined in the laboratory -scale apparatus 
may not be identical with those measured in actual rocket motors with widely variant conditions of 
propellant injection, chamber dimensions, mixing parameters, and chemical factors, the data 
should prove valuable in establishing a table of relative values of ignition lag to be expected with 
given propellant systems under operating conditions. 
The chemical factors involved in ignition with propellant systems employing nitric acid as the 
oxidizer may be broken down into three groups: neutralization reactions, nitration reactions, and 
oxidation reactions. These reactions may occur singly or  simultaneously in either the vapor or the 
liquid phase; the one which occurs most slowly would probably control the ignition-lag characteris- 
tics of the system, though it would not necessarily control the steady-state combustion. Consider- 
ing the temperatures involved, it seems probable that before visible flame appears, a portion of 
the mixed propellants has been vaporized although the controlling reactions which produce the 
necessary heat probably occur in the liquid phase. 
Motor Tests 
To arrive at the most suitable ANFA and RFNA combinations, over five hundred individual 
tes ts  were made by JPL with the ignition-lag motor completing a preliminary study of ignition lag 
as a function of various motor operating conditions. 
Representative data of the results a r e  presented below: 
Aniline-RFNA 
Several successful tests were made; however, in the majority of tests, hard starts were ex- 
perienced which blew the nozzle off the motor. Because of the severe conditions to which the 
motor was subjected by this fuel system, reproducibility from test  to test was poor; therefore no 
attempt was made to continue testing with aniline alone as fuel. The difficulty w a s  the result Of a 
pressure surge accompanying ignition in this motor which reaches a maximum value greater than 
the feed pressure. Hence an oscillating condition can occur in which ignition causes a cessation 
in the flow of propellants which in turn allows the flame to be extinguished in the chamber. After 
this occurrence the measurement of ignition-lag phenomena in the motor may be repeated. These 
subsequent ignition-lag measurements a r e  designated as secondary, inasmuch as temperature 
conditions, etc. in the motor are changing over the period of a given start .  
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I Appendix A 
I Ignition Characteristics of Various l iquid Propellants 
I 
A brief discussion of the ignition characteristics of aniline furfuryl alcohol (ANFA), red fum- 
l ing nitric acid (RFNA), which is of particular interest in connection with "hard" starts is pre- 
sented for background information. 
The following descriptions a r e  based on J P L  Progress Reports 20-138 and 9-30 (References A1 
and A2). 
1 Introduction 
The term spontaneous, when applied to rocket fuel systems, means self-igniting; however, 
spontaneous ignition should not be considered an instantaneous process. For a fuel system to be 
spontaneous, sufficient heat must be liberated through chemical reaction to elevate the temperature 
of the system to the point where kindling, or  ignition, will  occur. Therefore, a finite period of 
time will  elapse between the moment of mixing and the moment at which ignition occurs. This 
period is arbitrarily designated as ignition lag. It is evident that ignition lag, so  defined, is not in 
itself a fundamental quantity, but is dependent on many physical factors such as the conditions of 
mixing, initial temperature, and the geometrical configuration of the system, as well as the chemical 
reactivity of the fuel components. 
It is generally recognized that the starting characteristics of liquid-propellant rockets a r e  
affected by the ignition lags of the propellant systems employed. This has led to the development 
of equipment to measure ignition lags of rocket propellant systems accurately under conditions 
analogous to those encountered in motor operations. 
A comprehensive study of ignition lag should be subdivided into two basic categories which 
must be attacked separately. Because both physical and chemical factors a re  involved in the 
kinetics of spontaneous ignition, i t  becomes desirable to study ignition lag first  as a function of 
motor design and operating conditions, and second as a function of the chemical nature of the fuel 
systems independent of the mechanics involved in practical operation. This circumstance can 
only be approacnea, inasniucii as it is pr~c t icd ! ;~  impnssible to mix two spontaneous reactants 
without imposing the conditions of mixing upon the reaction; however, the chemical aspect could be 
studied by holding constant the various physical conditions in a given system. It is possible that 
information obtained through these two separate approaches can ultimately be correlated to form a 
more complete picture of the general problem. 
The present discussion deals with the results of an initial se r ies  of tests performed utilizing 
laboratory-scale apparatus. The more common propellant systems, including RFNA-aniline and 
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RFNA-furfuryl alcohol, were thoroughly investigated to determine their ignition-lag behavior 
under various conditions. Based on the results of these studies, parameters such as stream 
velocity, propellant-tank pressure, and mixture ratio, which may have some effect on ignition lag, 
were standardized and subsequent tests on other systems were performed under one set  of condi- 
tions to facilitate comparison of results. 
Although the absolute values of the ignition lags determined in the laboratory-scale apparatus 
may not be identical with those measured in actual rocket motors with widely variant conditions of 
propellant injection, chamber dimensions, mixing parameters, and chemical factors, the data 
should prove valuable in establishing a table of relative values of ignition lag to be expected with 
given propellant systems under operating conditions. 
The chemical factors involved in ignition with propellant systems employing nitric acid as the 
oxidizer may be broken down into three groups: neubalization reactions, nitration reactions, and 
oxidation reactions. These reactions may occur singly o r  simultaneously in either the vapor o r  the 
liquid phase; the one which occurs most slowly would probably control the ignition-lag characteris- 
tics of the system, though it would not necessarily control the steady-state combustion. Consider- 
ing the temperatures involved, it seems probable that before visible flame appears, a portion of 
the mixed propellants has been vaporized although the controlling reactions which produce the 
necessary heat probably occur in the liquid phase. 
Motor Tests 
To arrive at the most suitable ANFA and RFNA combinations, over five hundred individual 
tests were made by JPL with the ignition-lag motor completing a preliminary study of ignition lag 
as a function of various motor operating conditions. 
Representative data of the results a re  presented below: 
Aniline - RFNA 
Several successful tests were made; however, in the majority of tests, hard starts were ex- 
perienced which blew the nozzle off the motor. Because of the severe conditions to which the 
motor was subjected by this fuel system, reproducibility from test  to test was poor; therefore no 
attempt was made to continue testing with aniline alone as fuel. The difficulty was the result Of a 
pressure surge accompanying ignition in this motor which reaches a maximum value greater than 
the feed pressure. Hence an oscillating condition can occur in which ignition causes a cessation 
in the flow of propellants which in turn allows the flame to be extinguished in the chamber. After 
this occurrence the measurement of ignition-lag phenomena in the motor may be repeated. These 
subsequent ignition-lag measurements a r e  designated a s  secondary, inasmuch as temperature 
conditions, etc. in the motor are changing over the period of a given start. 
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Furfuryl Alcohol-RFNA 
Because hard s tar ts  had been experienced with aniline-RFNA in the present motor setup, it 
Smooth starts were obtained using furfuryl alcohol-RFNA 
was decided to use furfuryl alcohol, a smoother starting fuel than aniline, in the same motor rather 
than varying the motor configuration. 
with the same injectors and motor chambers used with aniline-RFNA. 
Furfuryl Alcohol-Aniline Fuel Mixtures 
In order to determine the effect on ignition lag of variations in the concentration of fur- 
furyl alcohol in aniline (when this fuel mixture is used with RFNA), a ser ies  of tests was made in 
which the concentration of furfuryl alcohol in aniline w a s  varied from 10 to 100 percent by volume. 
For these tests the motor system was not 
changed from the previous conditions. The 
ignition lags obtained a re  shown in Figure Al .  
Effect  of Mixture Ratio on Ignition Lag 
Motor tests were made to determine the 
effect of mixture ratio on ignition lag. Fur- 
furyl alcohol and RFNA again were used as the 
propellant system. A single pair of injectors 
was used, and the mixture ratio was varied by 
varying the tank feed pressures separately on 
the two propellant tanks. Total propellant flow 
rates were kept approximately constant by in- 
creasing the flow rate of one component while 
decreasing the other (Figure A2). 
Ignition lag increased when the motor was 
operated at very high and very low mixture 
ratios. The starts were audibly rougher at very 
low mixture ratios. 
Effects of Temperature on Ignition Lag 
No direct  tes ts  were made to determine the 
effect of temperature on ignition lag; however, 
several  effects were observed which were at- 
tributed to temperature. Considering ignition 
lag from a purely chemical standpoint, i t  would 
be assumed that increasing the temperature of 
the reactants would increase the rate of reac- 
tion and hence would decrease ignition lag. 
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Figure Al-Ignition lag on various furfuryl 
alcohol-aniline mixtures with &MA. 
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Figure A2-Ignition lag as function 
of mixture ratio. 
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Significance of Constant Ignition Lag a t  Various Mixture Ratios 
The ignition lag of RFNA-aniline and RFNA-furfuryl alcohol systems is essentially constant 
over a wide range of mixture ratios. If one considers the equation 
where 
C* = characteristic velocity (ft/sec) 
c = constant form to compensate for nonideality of combustion gases in the equation 
W = CnRT 
g = gravitational constant 32.2 ft/sec 
n = number of moles of gas present 
pmmX = maximum transient chamber pressure at ignition (psia) 
R = universal gas constant 
t i  = ignition lag (sec) 
v, = chamber volume (cu in.) 
y = ratio of average specific heats of exhaust gases 
L = average mass rate of flow of propellants before ignition (lb/sec), 
which defines the maximum transient pressure upon ignition (assuming no mass flow through the 
nozzle preceding ignition), it may be seen that the term cr2/-yvc, is essentially constant for any 
given propellant system. The derivation and discussion of this equation are given in Reference A3. 
The t e r m  which is the average weight rate of flow of the propellant before ignition may also 
be made constant for any given test. Thus Equation A1 may be written 
Pmax I K c * '  t i  , 
where K is a constant term, the value of which depends upon the propellant system used and the 
propellant flow rates employed. The fact that for certain propellant combinations the ignition lag 
is constant over a wide range of mixture ratios allows EquationA2 tobe still further simplified to 
Pmax 5 K ' c * '  . 
(where K '  = K t , )  for the range of constant t ,  in those systems. 
If c*' for any bipropellant system is plotted vs. percentage of oxidizer, a curve is obtained 
which has a maximum value and returns to a low value at 100 percent oxidizer. Values of the mix- 
ture ratio plotted along the abscissa of such a curve form a logarithmic scale. A representative 
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curve of this type is shown in Figure A3 for 
the WFNA-furfuryl alcohol system. It should 
be noted that the maximum value of the square 
of the characteristic velocity falls on the fuel- 
rich side of the stoichiometric mixture ratio. 
Also at no point on the fuel-rich side of the 
stoichiometric mixture ratio in the region of 
stable ignition is the value of less  than 
that at the stoichiometric point. However, at 
every point on the oxidizer-rich side, the 
square of the characteristic velocity is less 
than that at the stoichiometric mixture ratio. It 
may therefore be concluded that, for propellant 
systems in which the ignition lag is constant 
over a wide range of mixture ratios, minimum 
transient chamber pressures at ignition will 
be obtained if motors are started on the oxi- 
dizing side of the stoichiometric point. 
MIXTURE RATIO 
0.2 1 1.5 2.33 4 n \ 20,000 ,------+
STABLE IGNITION 
-RANGE- 
 
60 80 100 
OXIDIZER (percent) 
Figure A3-Characteristic velocity squared vs. per- 
centage of oxidizer and mixture ratio for WFNA-furfuryl 
alcohol system. 
Conclusions 
From the investigation of ignition-lag characteristics of various propellant systems with the 
laboratory-scale apparatus, the following conclusions may be drawn: 
1. There is good agreement between ignition-lag data obtained in the test motor and in the 
laboratory - scale equipment. 
2. The ignition lag of RFNA-aniline and RFNA-furfuryl alcohol systems is essentially in- 
dependent of mixture ratio over a wide range. 
3. Experiments utilizing the laboratory-scale apparatus show definitely that both the chemical 
composition and the structure of organic fuels affect the ignition lag of spontaneous liquid- 
propellant systems utilizing them. 
4. Since the maximum transient chamber pressure at ignition depends upon the square of the 
characteristic velocity, lower instantaneous pil.eszsiires z.iiu?c! hence s m ~ ~ t h e r  starts should 
be obtained by starting rocket motors on the oxidizing side of the stoichiometric mixture 
ratio. This conclusion applies to those systems whose ignition lags a r e  substantially in- 
dependent of mixture ratio. 
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Appendix B 
Launch Report of Hughes Aerobee 300 (S/N AF-49), 
18 August 1960,  Eglin Air Force Base* 
Aerobee 300 SIN AF-49 was launched from Eglin Air Force Base, Site A-11, on 27 July at 
14:03 CST. The rocket flight was terminated at approximately 25 seconds by an explosion in the 
second stage. The object of the experiment was to obtain AM, UHF communications at high altitude. 
i 
The vehicle was the fourth in a series of six for Hughes Aircraft Co. who is building the pay- 
load. For this flight, the payload had been modified to include telemetry and various changes in 
the transmitter. Telemetry monitored several skin temperatures, transmitter voltages and nose 
cone pressure. The 8" diameter of the payload had been extended to 37-1/4" and a 2-7/8" cylin- 
drical section had been inserted in the nose cone. The transmitter had been rescheduled to remain 
silent for 1/2 second, broadcast a carrier signal for 1/2 second, and then a modulated signal for 
1/2 second. The payload was pressurized to 18 psig with Freon gas, which was used for cooling 
the transmitter. 
The rocket consisted of a 2.5 KS 18,000 solid booster, and AJll-21 sustainer and a 1.8 KS 
7800 solid third stage. The second stage contained a DPN-41 range safety beacon and a DRW-11 
command cut-off system. 
Buildup of this unit was first completed in March. The launch date was postponed and the sus- 
tainer was returned to storage. On 22 July, the vehicle was removed from storage and subjected 
The forward end of the 
third stage shell grain was cemented in place with an e p o q  resin. Installation in the tower was 
accomplished on 26 July after completion of the horizontal checks. A high pressure helium system 
leak check was completed satisfactorily on the same day. Fuel servicing began following this 
check and was completed without incident. On 27 July, preliminary payload and beacon checks 
were completed prior to acid servicing. The third stage was removed for beacon rework and re- 
installed. Checks included firing circuit operation. Acid servicing was accomplished with no dif- 
ficulty and no spillage occurred. After last firing circuit and beacon checks, the igniters and squibs 
were installed and connected. Pressurization of the helium system was completed to 3450 psig 
I to an abbreviated series of checks in preparation for launch on 27 July. 
- --I -'-I ---A21 c:-:-- -t 1 And Pnnfrll stnn&rd Time. illlU IIC'IU u l l c r i  r r i r i i ~  a c  A z w  A --.._- - - ___. 
The flight terminated at 25 seconds when the second stage failed. Examination of the photo- 
graphs revealed erratic burning of the second stage for  the entire flight time. Slow motion film of 
the rocket traveling through the tower, showed irregular burning of the second stage, with changes 
*From B. Debrotin, Aerojet General Corp., El Monte, Calif. 
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in the color of the exhaust. The Contraves film shows intermittent burning starting at 4 seconds 
with a change in the color of the exhaust from white to dark gray. This continued with intermittent 
puffs of white smoke, until 25 seconds. During this time, the exhaust flame was not visible. At 
25 seconds an explosion took place toward the aft end of the second stage. Tracking of the third 
stage continued until impact, at which time telemetry was lost at 100 seconds. Tumbling of the 
package was observed. Radar was lost at 30 seconds, at which time the vehicle was 1000 yards 
offshore and at an altitude of 15,000 feet. The vehicle flight path was on the center of the range. 
Payload pressure remained constant at 2 psig and only a small r ise  in payload skin temperature 
was observed. 
+ , 
Appendix C 
Aerobee 150 Propulsion System Flow Tests 
As a result of the failure of flight 4.113 GA-GI, several individual flow tests were conducted 
by the Space General Corporation to investigate the effects of various Aerobee 150 propulsion 
system components under operating conditions. A description of these tests and the conclusions 
derived by the Space General Corporation follows. * 
Gas Burst Diaphragm Tests 
Aerobee gas burst diaphragms (P/N 2-003452), used in fuel and oxidizer lines, were tested to 
answer the following questions: 
(1) Do the diaphragms burst within the acceptance test range? 
(2) Do the oxidizer and fuel diaphragms break at the same pressure when installed in the 
actual system? 
(3) What is the time delay between fuel and oxidizer diaphragm bursting under actual flight 
conditions ? 
(4) Can the burst pressure of the diaphragm be changed through deformation caused by 
mishandling? 
(5) Does the nominal 100 psig leak test pressure have any effect on the diaphragm burst 
p res  s u r  e ? 
Table C1 describes a series of sixteen tests conducted in a setup simulating the actual flight 
configuration. This included regulator, gas manifold, check valve, fuel and oxidizer orifice, and 
simulated downstream ullage. Twenty-one diaphragms were tested, providing answers to all the 
pertinent questions as follows: 
(1) Tests 5, 11, 15, and 16 indicate that the diaphragms break between 200 and 300 psi, a s  
specified for acceptance testing at a low pressure rate of rise. All other tests were run 
at high pressure rates of rise, as experienced in the actual system, with resulting burst 
pressures  of 310 to  375 psi. 
(2) Tests 8 and 9 were run with deformed diaphragms showing no significant effect on burst  
pressure.  
*Space General COT. Memo. 5142:Mo805, 8 June 1964 to J. H. Hedberg from N. T. Migdal; Subject: Aerobee 150 Propulsion System 
Flow Tests. 
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Table C1 
Aerobee Gas Burst Diaphragm Tests. 
(Burst Diaphragm P/N 2-003452) 
Test 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
16 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Diaphragm 
Oxidizer 
Oxidizer 
Oxidizer 
Oxidizer 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
~~ ~ 
Pressure Rise 
Rate (psi/sec) 
70,000 
70,000 
70,000 
70,000 
425 
100,000 
150,000 
150,000 
150,000 
150,000 
16 
100,000 
150,000 
100,000 
100,000 
94,000 
106 
106 
650 
650 
Burst Pressure 
(PSM 
330 
325 
320 
350 
275 
350 
320 
3 10 
325 
320 
250 
325 
375 
330 
370 
340 
350 
260 
290 
280 
Remarks 
Fuel side capped; diaphragm shattered 
Fuel side capped; diaphragm shattered 
Fuel side capped; diaphragm shattered 
Fuel side capped; diaphragm shattered 
Fuel side capped; clean diaphragm 
break 
Oxidizer side capped; diaphragm 
shattered 
Oxidizer side capped; diaphragm 
shattered 
Oxidizer side capped; diaphragm 
shattered; used deformed diaphragm 
Oxidizer side capped; diaphragm 
shattered; used deformed diaphragm 
Oxidizer side capped; diaphragm 
shattered 
Oxidizer side capped; clean diaphgram 
break 
Both diaphragms installed; shattered 
Both diaphragms installed: shattered 
Both diaphragms installed; shattered 
100 psi leak test applied 
Both diaphragms installed 
Clean diaphragm break; 100 psi leak 
test applied 
Both diaphragms installed 
Clean diaphragm break; 100 psi leak 
test  applied 
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(3) For tests 14, 15, and 16, the 100 psig leak test was simulated prior to  burst. No signifi- 
cant effect on burst  pressure was realized. 
Test Category 
All tests 
From the available test data the following observations were made: 
Average Standard Deviation 
Sample Size Pressure 
(psig) (PSig) (percent) 
20 319.2 34 .O 10.6 
(1) The diaphragms break within the range of 200 to 300 psi as required for batch acceptance. 
(2) There is no significant difference in the fuel and oxidizer diaphragm burst pressure when 
tested under actual flight conditions either separately o r  in combination. 
(3) When both diaphragms are burst  together there is approximately a 1 to 2 millisecond 
delay between bursts with the fuel diaphragm breaking first. This has been attributed to 
the existence of the check valve in the oxidizer circuit upstream from the diaphragm. 
(4) Tests 8 and 9 indicate that no change in burst pressure is experienced when the diaphragms 
have obvious scratches, nicks, and dents. 
(5) The application of 100 psi on the diaphragms for 60 seconds had no apparent effect on the 
subsequent bur st pres  sur  es . 
A preliminary statistical evaluation of the data in Table C1 is given in Table C2 below. 
Table C2 
Statistical Summarization of Data in Table C1. 
Excluding low 
pressure rate- 
of-rise tests 
LOW pressure rate- I 
15 
5 
of-rise res t s  
By excluding the low pressure rate-of-rise tests for helium disc burst  pressures, the relative 
variance for the test lot is reduced. As the relative variances for the excluded items and the re -  
maining are of the same order oi magniiude, it is reasemble tn assume that they came from simi- 
lar populations but are independent. 
Using the data with the low pressure rise rates excluded, a three-sigma limit about the average 
burst  pressure,  P ,  yields a helium disc burst pressure of PB = 336 f 60 psig. This is higher than 
the current design limits, indicating that some production changes should be effected. An estimate 
of the probability of exceeding a given design range can be calculated for an entire lot produced at 
the same time if some members of the lot are sampled. This reliability estimate, with a 
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corresponding confidence limit, depends upon the values assigned to the upper and lower allowable 
burst  pressures. 
A tightening of production control is desirable. This could be effected by a tightening of the 
burst range specification on working drawings, with an average value for bursting pressures, PB, 
near 250 psig. 
Propellant Burst Diaphragm Tests 
Several Aerobee 150 propellant burst diaphragms (P/N 2-045074) were tested to determine 
burst pressures, r i se  rates, effects of mishandling, and effects of leak test  pressures. Only six 
samples were taken (Table C3). However, the consistency of the burst pressures indicated that 
sufficient data were available to dispel any major problem areas. The results of these tests were 
as follows: 
Table C3 
Propellant Burst Diaphragm Tests. 
(Burst Diaphragm P / N  2-045074) 
Test 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Pressure Rise 
Rate (psi/sec) 
100 
100 
3 
3 
300 
300 
Burst Pressure 
(Psi) 
47 
57 
48  
52 
55 
55 
Remarks 
10 psi leak test  pressure applied 
10 psi leak test pressure applied 
Mishandled diaphragm 
(1) The specified burst pressure range of 45-80 psi at a rise rate of 200 psi/min was met in 
two tests, and tests at higher rise rates were also within this pressure range. There does 
appear to be a slight trend for the burst pressure to increase after the diaphragm has been 
subjected to the 10 psi leak test. The mishandling of one diaphragm did not affect the 
bur st pres  sure. 
(2) With only two propellant discs being burst  at each of the three pressure rise rates, esti- 
mates of variance of burst pressure are not conclusive. Taking the values to be inde- 
pendent, the combined data gives, at a three sigma limit, P, = 52.7 f 16.8 psig. The re- 
lative variance for the samples is 5.6 percent, which compares favorably with other burst  
disc tests. The reliability estimations for the propellant burst  discs are dependent upon 
specified allowable burst pressure limits. 
30 
Fuel Shutoff Valve Tests 
A ser ies  of tests were conducted on fuel shutoff valves (P/N 2-007870) in order to investigate 
any contribution of this part  to Aerobee propulsion system failures, especially that of flight NASA 
4.113 GA-GI, following which an "0"-ring was found in  the burst diaphragm cage. The valve was 
modified by installing a screw in the valve cap (P/N 2-037093) which would allow the piston-seat 
assembly to be held in various positions in the flow stream prior to the beginning of the tests. 
Table C4 provides the results of tests conducted with valve assembled per drawing and seat (P/N 
2-031078) finger tight. The valve was flowed with a 450-psig back pressure. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Table C4 
Fuel Shutoff Valve Tests with Seat Finger Tight. 
6.9 
6.9 
6.3 
12.0 
18.5 
Pressure 
Drop (psi) 
0 .o 
0.031 
0.062 
0.093 
0.124 
0.155 
0.186 
0.217 
0.248 
0.279 
0.310 
0.341 
0.372 
0.408 
0.434 
0.465 
0.496 
0.527 
0.554 
Valve in unlocked condition 
O-ring came off seat 
Flow Rate 
(lb/sec H,O) 
3.96 
3.96 
3.96 
5.49 
6.89 
Valve Piston 
Position (in.) Remarks 
In place 
Lost 
In place 
In place 
In place 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Valve in locked position; full 
open 
Seat unscrewed and fell off 
after approximately 3 minutes 
flow time. Valve did not shut 
O f f .  
Valve in unlocked condition; 
full open; seat torqued to 
18 in-lb. 
Table C5 provides the results of tests conducted with seat torqued to 20 in-lb and set screw 
(at top of valve cap) screwed down one turn and held in place for each succeeding test. 
Table C5 
Fuel Shutoff Valve Tests with Seat Torqued 20 in-lb. 
Test 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
~ ~~ 
Pressure 
Drop (psi) 
12.5 
12.7 
13.1 
13.5 
13.8 
14.1 
14.5 
15.0 
15.6 
16.0 
16.7 
18.5 
19.5 
21.0 
23.0 
25.0 
28.2 
32.6 
40.0 
~~~ ~~ 
Flow Rate 
(lb/sec H,O) 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
0-Ring 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 
Lost 
o f f  
off  
off 
off  
o f f  
off  
off 
T- -1n-n u1 pLLc'- 
Valve Piston 
Position (in.) Remarks 
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Table C6 provides results derived from tests conducted with seat finger loose. 
Flow Rate 
(lb/sec H20) 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
Pressure 
15.0 
Valve Piston 
Position (in.) Remarks 
In place 0 .o Valve in locked position 
In place 0.244 Distance unscrewed in 1 
In place 
In place 
In place 
In place 0.307 Distance unscrewed in addi- 
tional 2 minutes. Total flow 
time 3 minutes. Seat did not 
come off. 1-1/4 threads hold- 
ing seat to piston 
minute 
6 
I
16.0 
Test 
1 
2 
Remarks Pressure Flow Rate Valve Piston 
Drop (psi) (lb/sec H,O) Position (in.) 
- 5.7 In place 0 .o Start of flow 
- 5.7 In place 0.308 Total time 3 minutes. 1-1/4 
thread holding seat to piston; 
same a s  prior test. 
A final test was  conducted to determine if  the seat (torqued to 20 in-lb) would return to the 
full open position o r  shutoff as the adjustment screw forced the seat into flow stream. Results of 
this test  show the seat returned to full open through all settings from zero o r  full open position to 
0.554 inches where the valve was almost closed. The seat had a total travel of 0.554 inches toward 
the closed position at the conclusion of the test. 
Three significant conclusions were derived from these tests concerning full shutoff valves. 
(1) The valve will not change the propulsion system flow characteristics when the seat is 
torqued to 18-20 in-lb. 
(2) Even when the seat  comes loose (valve locked o r  unlocked condition), the valve will not 
shut off. 
(3) The maximum increase in valve pressure drop of 12.5 to 40 psi is not sufficient to cause 
a propulsion system failure. 
I 
All test  results on gas burst diaphragms, propellant burst  diaphragms, and fuel shutoff valves 
indicate that each component functions in the system as designed. 
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Appendix D 
Aerobee Burst Diaphragm Acceptance Test Plan 
The test procedure for vendor testing of Aerobee 150 burst  diaphraghs is performed in ac- 
cordance with Space General Corporation Drawing No. 2-045074. This procedure requires the 
bursting of two of a lot of twelve assemblies at a pressure rate rise of 200 psi/min. Any burst 
pressure beyond the specified range of 45-80 psi requires rejection and rework of all assemblies 
made from the same material as the unacceptable burst diaphragm. 
At the time of the failure of NASA flight 4.113 GA-GI, the vendor tests were the only ones 
performed. As a result of this flight failure, an in-house vendor acceptance test  plan was formu- 
lated. The following vendor test plan is now applicable to all Aerobee burst diaphragms. 
Introduction 
The following plan describes an acceptance program based on MIL-STD-414 and ARGMA 
sampling criteria. The tests will be performed at SGC by SGC personnel. This plan wi l l  supple- 
ment the tool-proofing sampling plans now in effect, and will increase control over the quality of 
incoming diaphragms. The sampling plan will assure .9985 reliability for critical tolerance limits 
and a .996 reliability for less critical limits, e.g., lower limit of the oxidizer burst diaphragm. 
After a sufficient sample has been accumulated the program will convert from MIL-STD-414 to 
ARGMA, which will allow a 50 percent reduction in the required sample size. 
Burst Pressure Limit Criteria 
The critical limits for the fuel and oxidizer diaphragms are set to assure at least a .9985 
probability that the differential burst pressure is not less than 25 psi. The less critical limit will  
assure  a reliability of .996 that the fuel diaphragm burst  pressure will not exceed the limits of the 
helium system and that the oxidizer diaphragm will survive the leak checks. The sampling plan 
will assure  a .996 reliability that both the helium and propellant diaphragms burst within the 
functional limits. 
Propellant Valve Assembly Diaphragms (150A P/N 1103290-1, -31 
The nominal values of the fuel and oxidizer burst diaphragms are stated to be 325 10 
and 200 f 10 psig (160 10 in system), respectively. The critical limit for the oxidizer 
diaphragm will be 250 psig and the critical limit for the fuel diaphragm will  be set at 275 
psig. The less critical limit of the fuel disc will be set at 375 psig (i.e., 55 psi less than 
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the estimated minimum helium pressure of 430 psig). 
diaphragm will be set at 150 psi. 
The less critical limit for the oxidizer 
I 
Drawing Limits 
325 f 10 
200 f 10 
250 f 50 
45 - 80 
Helium Burst Diaphragms [150/150A P/N 2 -003452)  , 
Acceptance Limits 
325 f 50 
200 f 50 
250 f 125 
50 f 25 
A conservative estimate of minimum regulated helium pressure is 430 psig. Nominal drawing 
tolerances are 250 f 50 psig. Functional limits of 250 f 125 psig will allow a 55 psi differential 1 
between the minimum helium pressure and the burst pressure and a 25 psi differential for the 
100 psig leak check. I 
Propellant Diaphragm (150 P/N 2 -045741  
These diaphragms have a specified nominal burst pressure of 50 psig. The upper functional 
limit will be 75 psig and the lower limit will be 25 psig to protect against the 10 psig leak test. 
The drawing and functional acceptance limits for each diaphragm a r e  presented in Table D1. 
Table D1 
Part 
Fuel Diaphragm (1 103290-3) 
Oxidizer Diaphragm (1103290-1) 
Helium Diaphragm (2-033452) 
Propellant Diaphragm (2-045074) 
Acceptance Test Plan (MIL-STD-414) 
Lot Definition 
A lot will be defined as the set of diaphragms made in one run from a single sheet by a single 
operator, on a single machine. Manufacture of the diaphragms will be controlled by the sampling 
plan given on each drawing. The SGC acceptance program will supplement these sampling plans 
and will  be used to determine and control the reliability of the diaphragms. 
Sample Size 
A sample will  be drawn at random from each lot using Table D2. Randomization can be achieved 
by numbering discs consecutively as they are produced and then drawing from a table of random 
digits the numbers of the discs for each test. 
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Test Procedure 
The diaphragms will be acceptance tested 
in a fixture which simulates the actual operating 
conditions. The fuel piston assembly (8002719) 
will be assembled in the fuel side of the start 
valve per drawing 2-066739 for the burst test on 
the fuel diaphragm (1103290-3). For the oxi- 
dizer diaphragm (1103290-1) the oxidizer piston 
assembly (8002213) will be assembled in the 
Lot Size 
11-110 
111-180 
181-300 
Minimum Sample Size 
10 
15 
20 
oxidizer side of the valve per 2-066739. The helium diaphragm (2-063994-3) will be tested in the 
relief elbow assembly (2-063994-3). The propellant diaphragms (2045074) for the Aerobee 150 
will burst in the case assembly (2-016589) using a 2-01659-2 retainer. 
Where applicable, bolts securing the diaphragm to the piston assembly will be torqued to 45 
in-lbs. Bolts holding the fixture flange cover should be torqued to 70 in-lbs. The rate of nitrogen 
pressure rise will be regulated to simulate the actual system pressure rise rate. 
Calculation 
On the basis of the burst tests the following statistics are calculated: average burst pressure, 
standard deviation, 
ZXi] i =  1 '
where xi is the burst pressure of the ith sample disc and n = sample size. 
Using X and S ,  the upper and lower quality indices, Q, and Q, are computed by the following 
equations: 
- 
u - x  
= p 
I 
where u is the upper acceptance tolerance limit and L is the lower tolerance limit. The acceptable 
quality limits Qu and QL are shown in Figures D1, D2, and D3. The two limits are given for each 
diaphragm in Table D3. 
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Accep tance/R ejec tion Cri  €eria 
If both the calculatedvalue of Q, and Q, fall 
on or above the line corresponding to the ap- 
propriate sample size the lot is accepted. If 
&they of the values Of QL or Q, falls below the 
appropriate line the lot is rejected. 
Table D3 
IJpper and Lower Acceptance Limits. 
(bursting pressure in psi) 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
Helium 
Propellant 
Upper Limit 71 Lower Limit 275 150 125 
25 
REJECT 
3.0 
r3 3 2’51 .0 
ACCEPT 
n=20 
/- 
I\ sAccEn:20 
n= 15’ n= 10 
1 REJECT REJECT 
L--u- 
1 .o 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 
Q L  
Figure D1-Aerobee 150A fuel diaphram 
acceptance criteria. 
ARGMA Acceptance Criteria 
3.0 
2.5 
3 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
3 . 0  
2.5 
3 
0 2.0 
1.5 
1 .o  
REJECT 
- 
- 
- REJECT 
- 
u 
1.0 1.5 
ACCEPT 
n=20 
REJECT 
I I 1 I 
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 
Q L  
Figure D2-Aerobee 150A oxidizer diaphram 
acceptance criteria. 
n=15’ n=10 
REJECT REJECT 
I I I I I I 
1 .o 1.5 2.0 2.5 3 . 0  3.5 
Q L  
Figure D3-Helium and Aerobee 150A propellant 
diaphram acceptance criteria. 
After a sufficient number of lots have been tested, the required sample size can be reduced 
by converting the acceptance program f rom MIL-STD-414 (unknown variance) to the ARGMA 
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acceptance criteria.* Depending on lot-to-lot variation, 10-20 lots should be inspected before mak- 
ing the conversion. At this point the sample size can be reduced from 10 under the MIL-STD-414 
approach to 5 under the ARGMA acceptance plan. In addition to a reduced sample size the ARGMA 
approach increases control over the quality of incoming diaphragms. 
Calculations 
Estimate of Population Standard Deviation 
Constant for Upper 
Tolerance Limit, k ,  Diaphragm 
After it has been shown that there is no significent lot-to-lot variation, the estimate of the 
population standard deviation is computed as follows: 
Constant for  Lower 
Tolerance Limit, k, 
nk - k 
where n is the sample size of the ith lot tested and s i  is the standard deviation of the ith lot. 
Tolerance Limits 
A sample of five discs is drawn at random from each lot regardless of the size of the lot. The 
mean of each sample is then calculated using Equation D1. The upper and lower tolerance limits 
are computed as follows: 
(D5) - T, x - k , 6  
as defined by Equation D4 with k , and k ,  given in Table D4 for each diaphragm. 
Table D4 
Fuel 
Oxidizer 
Helium 
Propellant 
3.42 
3 -68 
3.42 
3.42 
3.68 
3.42 
3.42 
3.42 
AccePtance/Rejection Calculated Criteria 
If the calculated value of T, is less then the u limit given for each diaphragm in Table D3 the 
lot is accepted, if the calculated value of T, i sgrea te r  than the L limit given in Table D3. If 
either of these two cr i ter ia  is not satisfied the lot is rejected. 
*“Rel iabi l i tyof  Compl iance  with One-sided Speci f icat ion Limits when Data i s  Normally Distributed,” ARGMA (Army Rocket and Guided 
M i s s i l e  ’4gency)  TR-SBIR, 15  September 1961. 
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“The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be 
conducted so as to contribute . . . to the expansion of himan knowl- 
edge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space. The Administration 
shall provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination 
of information concerning its activities and the results thereof .” 
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